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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senior Research Staff on International Communism

**THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Peking, 1 October 1959)**

CIA/SRS-12

ISS NO. 80-01445R

DOC NO. 1

FOLDER NO. 17

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DATE 05 Apr. 82 103430

1 September 1959

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THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION
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INTRODUCTION

1. The first days of October 1959 will witness the celebration by the Chinese People's Republic of its 10th Anniversary. So far there has been relatively little "build up" for the occasion in Chinese propaganda, with the result that world attention has not yet been focused on its implications. Yet this celebration will surely make a sharp challenge for the spotlight in the sequence of "spectaculars" which will highlight the closing months of 1959 - the Eisenhower and Khrushchev visits and a possible "summit" conference.

2. The total silence of the Chinese Communist leaders during most of August 1959 - even their whereabouts was unknown - was broken by the broadcast of the Communique and Resolution of the Central Committee session, held in Lushan 2-16 August. Both of these remarkable documents will require prolonged analysis. For the purposes of this paper, however, they provide certain important clues, hitherto lacking, on the realignment of policy which the Chinese leaders have undertaken in the wake of the overvaulting "Great Leap Forward," the tumultuous launching of the commune system, and the ferment of international crises in the first half of 1959.

3. Nevertheless, in attempting to forecast the nature of the 10th Anniversary proceedings, we still lack such fundamental indications of intention as the Seven Year Plan and the Theses on Education which preceded the XXI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, 27 January-5 February 1959). Indeed, we may surmise that the

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Chinese Party leaders, for psychological reasons of their own, will maintain an atmosphere of suspense until the last moment. This may be further motivated by a prudent decision to await the outcome of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, before determining the final line.

4. Any forecast of such an event as the 10th Anniversary must rest on an appraisal of past achievements and on a decision - basically intuitive - whether to extrapolate their aggregate curve continuously, or to give it a sharp upward or downward break. Consequently, in discussing the various possibilities of the Peking celebration, we shall both explicitly and implicitly be presenting our own evaluation of the Chinese Communist regime's record and a projection of its immediate and longer range future. In a sense, therefore, this paper is an essay in speculative estimation which permits itself the liberty of unfettered divination upon an imminent event.

THE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

5. The first question which arises is whether the 10th Anniversary will be primarily a manifestation of Communist China as a nation or of International Communism as a whole. Here we have only Moscow precedents: the XX CPSU Congress (February 1956), the 40th Anniversary (November 1957) and the XXI Congress, each of which in varying measure represented triumphs and portents of both the Soviet Union and the entire movement. There is no Peking precedent, and yet the logic of Communist ceremony suggests that this gathering will likewise minister to the deeply felt need to demonstrate the might and solidarity of the "socialist camp". At the same time it will almost certainly provide the cover for a conclave, an inner strategy council of the leaders of Communist parties

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throughout the world. But in its sharpest immediate impact it will be Peking's own "show, " the glorification of a specifically Chinese "road to socialism."

6. From the viewpoint of International Communism, if, as we anticipate, Khrushchev and most of the leaders from the Bloc and Free World Communist parties - and some socialist parties - are in attendance, the occasion will have a dual aspect: (a) a fraternal congratulation by the other eleven members of the Bloc on a triumphant decade of Communist China; (b) a meeting of the sixty-odd Bloc and Free World members of the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, which has been described as the framework of the "Socialist Commonwealth"¹ - or "world socialist system" - and as the continuator of the Comintern.²

7. Whether the 10th Anniversary will issue both inner and outer circle proclamations, as did the 40th Anniversary in Moscow, is uncertain, but we are inclined to anticipate that there will be some major formal pronouncement of International Communism. It would indeed be difficult to outdo the Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto in their ominous note of challenge, defiance, and assumed victory. There will probably be some tactical moderation designed to exploit the Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange of visits as a prelude to more comprehensive "summitry." "Peaceful co-existence"

¹Cf. SRS-10, The "Socialist Commonwealth of Nations": Pattern for Communist World Organization, 18 June 1959.

²Cf. US Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, "The Revival of the Communist International and Its Significance for the United States," (May 1959).

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will be a central theme, but it will be embroidered with a running obbligato of denunciation against the unregenerate "circles" of "imperialists, warmongers, revanchists and monopolists, " who forever lay snares in the path of those seeking to "relax tensions." It is hardly possible to say how strident this harsher note will be. There may be, as often in the past, a contrasting orchestration, in which the Chinese voices highlight the dissonant and the Soviet the consonant themes. We should not be misled into thinking that the arrangers are therefore at odds. Both are agreed that "peaceful co-existence" is merely the circumstance of protracted "struggle."

8. We are convinced that the international aspects of the Anniversary will demonstrate a principle, too often ignored in the Free World: the subordination of the foreign policy of individual Communist states to the higher goals of International Communism. We do not believe that the leaders of the Soviet Union or Communist China would admit any basic conflict between what are traditionally regarded as "national interests" and the campaign for the world triumph of the Movement. It is true that the intricacies of Communist world tactics, which at times defy analysis, sometimes tempt us to conclude that the Axis partners are pursuing separate if not actually divergent courses. Thus, Moscow is often presented as a restraining influence on an adventuristically inclined Peking, and conversely, Mao is held to be jealously seeking to restrict Khrushchev's free wheeling "summitry."

9. Whatever elements of friction and rivalry or conflicting notions of expedience may permeate the inner councils of Communism, they do not, in our judgment, provide open clues which we can uncritically accept as a basis for our own policy. If harmony of Communist action is threatened within, solidarity of external position becomes all the more imperative. For this reason alone, if not because basic identity of views is present, the Anniversary as a demonstration of purpose in world affairs will almost certainly be a "love-feast."

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10. New or refurbished variants may be introduced into the standard picture of the world political scene which such meetings traditionally present. China, having risked and incurred indignation and hostility through its treatment of Tibet, may choose either a brazen or a conciliatory note, or both in seeming contradiction. It might, for instance, announce that "reactionary feudalism" has been overcome in Tibet which will soon be granted true autonomy and equal rights with the other areas of non-Han Chinese nationalities. On the other hand - and this would be in line with its generally harder treatment of the minorities - it might announce that the vast undeveloped lands of Tibet, together with other peripheral provinces, will be opened for settlement and cultivation - in other words, colonization - by millions of the more "progressive" peoples from densely populated China proper.

11. The charge of violating the Pancha Shila - the Five Points of Bandung - remains sensitive in Asia, and even deeply offended Nehru has been reluctant to apply it to the Tibetan intervention. Chou En-lai, deciding that the best defense is an offense, might seek through sharpened attacks on the United States "presence" in the Far East, to open a new phase of Asian diplomacy. He might propose some form of Asiatic summit meeting to discuss the "aggression" in Laos or a more general "relaxation of tensions" in the area. Although any appeal for a broad summit meeting in Asia would probably meet with a rebuff, the Chinese might have the effrontery to propose something like a Khrushchev-Mao-Nehru-Sukarno version, thereby snubbing the other Southeast Asian states and further demonstrating China's ascendancy in the area.

12. It is possible that Communist China might adopt new tactics in seeking to extend its international influence, and might even show that it, like the Soviet Union, can also play the role of the beneficent sun rather than the blustering

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wind. A smile of ingratiation toward the world, an invocation of the "Bandung spirit", an offer to consider renunciation of force in the settlement of the Taiwan issue, an agreement to hold free elections in Vietnam and Korea, a bid to settle other issues which prevent China's general recognition and acceptance into the United Nations, are all conceivable. There is, however, little present inkling of such conciliatory intention, and we find it difficult to believe that Moscow and Peking would find it advantageous to forego the flexibility of action which a hard-soft dialectic, apportioned between the partners, can afford.

"NATIONAL LIBERATION" AND POLITICAL UNITY

13. As we have suggested above, the 10th Anniversary, despite its international fanfare, will be primarily a glorification of Communist China. It will express the pride of an aspiring and potentially mighty nation welding into unity three basic elements: party, state and masses. At the same time, it will be an insistent call for continuing vigilance against "bourgeois" enemies.

14. First and foremost the Anniversary will be a celebration of independence after a century of foreign domination, China's own "national liberation" from "imperialism" comparable to that which other countries of Asia have recently won. This will differ, however, from other such occasions in that the sense of release and triumph will be far greater. China, with its unique historic continuity of culture and power, has suffered profound frustration from a century of impotent submission to foreign "barbarian" domination. The reciprocal passions of patriotism and xenophobia will be whipped to the point of highest intensity, focusing on the anomaly of China's sovereignty and weight in world affairs, contrasted with its continued ostracism by the supreme embodiment of world

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comity, the United Nations. The "unfinished business" of the Civil War, Taiwan, will be alternately menaced and derided, and dark hints of surprising future developments may be conveyed, a new military attack or a "deal" for peaceful return to the mainland sway with honorable treatment of regenerate members of the "Chiang clique."

15. A bid for the loyalty of the more than twelve million Overseas Chinese will undoubtedly be made. Communist China is conscious of the unfavorable impact which the violent first stage of the commune drive has had on a major source of foreign exchange - remittances by relatives abroad. It is also sensitive to the pressures against local Chinese communities which have been mounting recently in Indonesia and South Vietnam. Possibly Peking may start a campaign to increase the flow of students back to the Motherland for higher schooling, and to encourage visits of expatriates to their homes and families. The success of such a move would depend on its being highly selective, i.e. confining it to communes which could present a picture of relative prosperity and social moderation.

16. The rise of Communist China as a nation, with its own specific interests and goals, will be stated to be in harmony with the inexorable historical processes leading to the triumph of the "world socialist system." A bid for leadership among the newly liberated and still unliberated "colonial" nations will be advanced, and the Chinese model of "struggle" will be held up for emulation.

GLORIFICATION OF THE PARTY

17. Particular weight will be laid upon the achievement of political unity by the Chinese People's Republic. Party and state will be presented as a dual entity, incarnating

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the victory of the "socialist" over the "bourgeois" revolution.¹ At the same time the primacy of Party over state will be convincingly demonstrated.

18. We may feel sure that the entire occasion will be a glorification of Mao Tse-tung. It seems likely that a specifically Chinese form of "personality cult" will be devoted to the leader of the revolution and that he will be presented under a multiplicity of lights, as the benevolent, wise father, as the incarnation of the will and aspirations of the entire Chinese people, as the victorious general, and as the supreme ideologist, not to mention as poet, scholar, philosopher, worker, and even athlete. Indeed, it may not be going too far to speculate that the recent secret conference of party leaders had as its primary task the drawing up of some new program of "national construction" and ideological Great Leap Forward with which his name and historic role could be identified. It is not easy to forecast precisely how the claim of Mao as "continuator of Lenin" will be harmonized with the no less pressing claim of Khrushchev to that same title. We would assume that a subtle process of "socialist emulation" between the two coryphaei will be marked by gestures of deference, coupled with unmistakable efforts by each to display the greater luster. The fine points of such an interplay may well challenge the analysts of esoteric Communist communication.

19. The lesser leaders will be displayed in various attitudes of harmony and "comradeship in arms." If, as seems highly probable, Liu Shao-chi is the firmly designated heir apparent, there may be some interesting new indications of his precedence over Chou En-lai.

¹ A Revolutionary Museum in honor of the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is scheduled to open in Chekiang on the National Day. New official histories of the CPR and the CPC might also be announced.

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20. The Party as a whole will be magnified as a powerful, dynamic, militant, growing organism. Its hectic expansion during the past ten years will be described as a process of sound recruitment of the finest elements of the proletariat, cadres youthful in spirit and strong in discipline. In presenting the vast challenge which lies before the Party, the primary note will be hortatory but the theme of enthusiasm may be modulated by further warnings against "impetuosity," "utopianism," and "dizziness with success," such as were uttered in December 1958 in reaction to the excesses of the early communization program. There may even be hints or warnings of the need for purges or disciplinary action, including the assignment of over-zealous or inexperienced cadres to corrective periods of productive labor among the masses. The speakers will elaborate on the tasks lying ahead of the cadres, stressing the overcoming of "contradictions" between them and the people and the need for a constant effort to improve the "style of work," the "relation of theory and practice" and the "close connection with life" and to narrow the "gap between manual and mental labor."

21. Under the beneficent and all-wise guidance of the Party, supported by the state apparatus, China will be represented as a model of political unity. For the first time in centuries, it will be affirmed, central control extends firmly through the intermediate to the lowest levels. Warlordism has become a memory of the unhappy past and the writ of Peking runs swiftly throughout the vast domain. Innumerable local celebrations will echo these central themes.

MILITARY TRIUMPHS

22. The 10th Anniversary will probably be the occasion for a major display of military power. The People's Liberation Army will show its strength and discipline. Modern

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weapons will be paraded with special emphasis on those of Chinese manufacture.¹

23. Nevertheless there will probably be a number of muting factors. The overall line of "peaceful co-existence," and the imminence of the Eisenhower visit to the Soviet Union, perhaps to be followed by other summit occasions, may lead to some restraint in the flexing of military muscles. Continued dependence on Soviet military aid and the fact that this so far has not extended to nuclear weapons will inhibit excessive boasting about specific Chinese capabilities. The role of the PLA differs considerably from that of the Soviet Red Army and may be in a process of re-evaluation. Past and perhaps continuing reductions in the size of the armed forces may be tied in with the desire to strengthen the productive manpower of the communes and to provide an armature of training and discipline for local militia units. It is possible that some new basis of relation between the regular Army and the militia will be announced and that the "every man a soldier" program will be given an orientation more economic than military.

24. It is also possible that this may be the occasion for some statement of Chinese views on the subject of disarmament. Peking has displayed an ambivalent attitude toward Khrushchev's proposal of a "nuclear free zone" for Asia, but this may give way to unequivocal endorsement. If Peking concludes that it may have to "go it alone" in the nuclear weapons field and that this prospect is rather unpromising for the next several years, it might take some initiative in support of the idea of restricting the membership in the nuclear club to the present members. On the whole, however, this would appear doubtful and we incline to believe that if anything, China

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A new seven-story museum of Chinese Communist military history which has been completed in Peking may be officially opened in connection with the Anniversary.

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will declare that it is pressing forward to achieve its own atomic capability. It is possible, of course, but unlikely that China will announce either the actual grant of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union or some assurance of the latter's support in pushing a Chinese program for their development. Rather more probable would be the announcement that guided missiles had been made available and that nuclear warheads will be supplied with them under joint Soviet and Chinese control.

THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

25. The tone of the economic aspects of the Anniversary has been set by the Communique and Resolution of the Central Committee meeting at Lushan. These documents have been treated by the American press in a rather complacent spirit. All the emphasis has been on Chinese admission of errors of planning and statistical reporting and on the scaling down of over-ambitious goals. We are inclined to question the adequacy of this treatment. The avowal of mistakes is indeed frank, but there is no apparent sense of discomfiture. Rather, the cautious and even casual announcement seems to constitute a demonstration of courage. It is possible, if not probable, that the Communist regime, by using candor in admitting shortcomings, is trying to rid the Chinese mind of the fear of "loss of face" in emulation. This ancient concept does not fit into the psychology of materialism and dialectics. It is alien to a "socialist" society. It can only impede the Soviet-introduced catharsis of self-criticism. Indeed, we should anticipate a gradual fading of the "loss of face" cliché in mainland China where it will be replaced by the idea that guilt can be atoned without permanent loss of social or political status.

26. Concern with loss of prestige abroad will also probably not be great. The Chinese Communists expect, and indeed often seem to provoke, hostile criticism in the

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"capitalist" world. In Asia, where they may be more sensitive, they probably count on the two most important countries, India and Japan, taking sober note of the impressive progress which the Great Leap Forward has achieved, even after the false starts have been checked. Here, too, "face" in the traditional sense probably does not greatly interest the Chinese leaders.

27. In evaluating this remarkable sequence of economic events, we naturally must ask whether the Chinese Communist leaders have known what they were doing all along or whether they were themselves victims of auto-intoxication, that very "dizziness with success" which they have condemned in their cadres. It is difficult to believe that the leaders were in fact deluded by the extravagant statistics which poured in on them. Rather, we are led to conclude that they permitted the inflation to go on and gave it a temporary endorsement, fully realizing that a deflation would have to follow. The question therefore is, why did they pile Ossa on Pelion by projecting the 1959 planned goals to altogether fantastic heights? It is possible that they did so deliberately, with a psychological intent which may be difficult for us to fathom, but which was probably rational. We are dealing here with a form of economic energetics for which there are few case histories - forced collectivization after the NEP in the USSR may be one - but which may prove to be the key to China's forward impulse. It may not be far-fetched to assert that Mao, who certainly understands the Chinese peasantry better than his foreign - and perhaps his domestic - critics, has applied his classic principle of action, "imbalance-balance-imbalance, " with maximum boldness. Leaping from 175 to 350 million tons of grain, compounding that to 525 only to drop back to 250 million tons, is a breathtaking feat of acrobatics. What is left, when participants and spectators stop for breath, is a partially realized and probably eventually fully realizable expansion of Chinese agriculture

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which will alter the entire economic balance of Asia. The threat of millions of tons of exportable rice hanging over Southeast Asia may be the nightmare of tomorrow.

28. Thus, if we view the forward and backward leaps, in the light of internal Chinese dynamics, we may conclude that they will be reflected positively in the Anniversary celebration. Communist China will be presented as firmly on the march toward the goal of completed "socialist construction." Statistics will be used exuberantly, though with less sheer abandon than hitherto. Natural calamities, floods, drought and pests, will be used both as a scapegoat and as an incitement to greater effort, and there will be continuing praise for the efforts which the regime has made to overcome them. There will be promises of limited improvements in the availability of consumer goods, of modern health, welfare and educational services, and of an eventual relaxation in the hard driving pace of work. This buoyant prospect will, however, be carefully hedged with warnings that the way is not easy. Sacrifice and austerity will be demanded. It will be interesting to note whether the promise made by Mao in 1958, that the period of truly superhuman exertion would last only three years, is reconfirmed or tacitly dropped. We are inclined to believe that surcease of overstrain will be held forth, perhaps within the original time limit, but that the need for continuing effort will be the dominant theme.

29. As to the "mistakes" of planning and execution of unrewarding though spectacular local programs, such as the small iron and steel furnaces, the tone for the Anniversary will likewise probably be that of the Lushan communique. In an almost offhand fashion, the decision whether to proceed along the earlier lines of the Great Leap has been left to local judgment. If useful products can be manufactured through backyard smelters, well and good, but let the communes not waste manpower or clutter the transportation system. Peking will

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preside over the great central plants and installations which are to provide the base of the long range industrial program. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the economic treatment of the Anniversary will be the light which it throws on planning for provincial factories of middle size, especially cement and fertilizer plants. This may be the area in which the specifically Chinese "model" will differentiate itself most clearly from that of the Soviet Union, and make its bid for acceptance by other undeveloped countries.

30. It seems likely that the Great Leap Forward will develop new slogans equally vaulting but less compulsive than those which have served during the past two turbulent years. The interim slogan "the whole nation a chess board, " with its implication of deliberate calculation of forward moves, may be converted into something more dynamic, but still emphasizing plan. Possibly the projective theme will be an elaboration of the current "walking on two legs, " which can best be visualized in the classic image of the Chinese laborer carefully balancing two buckets hung from a pole across his shoulder and adjusting his pace to their shifts. Specifically, it means maintaining traditional small-scale forms of industry and agriculture while pushing forward with modern and large-scale construction.¹

31. China's prime asset will be held to be its reservoir of manpower, unique in quantity and high in potential if not actual quality. There will probably be a confident assertion that the rapid growth of population not only is no danger but is a positive necessity for the gigantic progress which is contemplated. This may not in fact be the sincere conviction of the Chinese leaders, who may view with apprehension the race

¹ Other slogans which will probably be continued are "politics in command" and "increase production and practice economy." The latter seems in need of "catchier" formulation.

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between productivity and population, at least over the long run. For this reason there may be some cross currents, perhaps reflected hints of further restrictions of family life in the communes, which would imply eventual renewed emphasis on the presently dampered population control campaign.

32. China's natural assets will also be praised as more than adequate for its human requirements. It is possible that, very much as Khrushchev justified the scrapping of the sixth Five Year Plan by the announcement that the discovery of new natural resources had made it obsolete, so the Chinese may tell of important geological surveys revealing hitherto unsuspected treasures of minerals, oil, and natural gas.

33. At the same time basic lacks and general backwardness will also be acknowledged in explanation of such failures as cannot be concealed, partly by way of announcing heightened efforts to remedy them. Thus it seems likely that the inadequacy of the transportation system will be freely discussed and strenuous measures be announced to continue the expansion of the rail and highway network. Shortages of building material may be admitted, especially since in many areas the evidence thereof is inescapable.¹

34. It is difficult to foresee what specific economic projections of the future will be made. There appear to be no "control figures" such as were extensively paraded before and during the XXI CPSU Congress. It may even be doubted whether anything like a stable economic plan over the next ten years can be said to exist. All that we have are vague "catch up with and

¹ Recent reports have indicated that the completion of major factories has been held up by fundamental shortages and even a number of the new buildings in Peking, which were to have glorified the 10th Anniversary, will stand uncompleted.

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outstrip" promises and exhortations. The hard pattern of investment must necessarily be far more tentative and elastic than is the case with the now virtually mature Soviet economy. While the Chinese economy has perhaps reached the "takeoff into self-sustained growth," its flight is as yet erratic. Much depends upon the scale with which the USSR and the European satellites continue to provide basic capital. Possibly some announcement of a special Bloc contribution in honor of this occasion may be made together with assurances of a longer term development support. In any case, it is almost certain that profound if not fulsome gratitude will be expressed toward the USSR and somewhat more measured appreciation to the lesser members of the socialist system. The fact that Soviet support has taken the form of loans which are being repaid will be cited as evidence of the self- and mutual respect which governs economic relations in the "socialist commonwealth." There may be an announcement of closer cooperation with the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and even of the transformation of China's observer status to full membership.

35. Chinese potential for dynamic economic activity on a world scale will be heavily stressed. The rapid expansion of trade with both the Bloc and Free World which has taken place in the past few years will probably be projected at an even steeper upward rate. Chinese aid to underdeveloped countries, which must constitute a much greater strain on available resources than in the case of the Soviet Union, may not be emphasized so prominently, because of possible adverse internal reactions. Nevertheless in at least indirect fashion Peking may seek to range itself beside Moscow in the group of economic Big Brothers. In any case it will hold out its Great Leap Forward as a model for under-developed countries, perhaps implying that it is more relevant to their needs and aspirations than that of the highly integrated Soviet economy. It does not follow, however, that such a claim would be entirely distasteful to the

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Soviet Union, which is as much aware as the United States that its advanced forms and techniques are far beyond the reach of most of the backward nations of the world. Indeed, precisely in this interaction of an accessible Chinese model and a still unattainable Soviet one lies much of the effectiveness of the Communist economic offensive.

36. It is doubtful whether the time schedule for the future of "building socialism" will be made any more specific than it has been in the past. There may be some studiously vague allusions to a period of twenty or thirty years within which something fundamental will be accomplished, but it is doubtful that China, after the Soviet frostiness of last autumn, will make over-precise and over-enthusiastic claims of its advance on the road to Communism.

37. On the economic ideological front it seems likely that there will be no striking innovations. China has accepted with outward grace Khrushchev's emphatic strictures against minimizing the role of incentive in "socialist construction." The so-called system of "free supply" which consists largely of meal tickets in the communal messhalls may be allowed to serve as an earnest of the principle of "unto each according to his needs" which will prevail in the distant future of full-blown Communism. In practical terms at present, this is little more than a bookkeeping device closely related to the old labor-day point system and payment in kind.

38. Beyond doubt the anniversary will throw some light on the future of the Chinese communes. We believe that the "tidying up" process which was introduced by the Wuhan resolutions of 1958 will be pronounced successful to date. It seems doubtful, however, that any further regression toward pre-communal forms will take place. Such reforms as have been reported - limited decentralization to the village or co-operative farm level, easing pressure on family life, private

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plots and possessions, abatement of military types of discipline and general overwork - have probably all reduced the hostility and frustration which the initial pell mell rush of communization induced among the peasantry. This is not the place to make a projection of the commune as an institution but we venture to predict that the 10th Anniversary will firmly proclaim that it is the bridge over which Chinese society will march toward Communism.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE

39. The social transformations which have been wrought in the past ten years will be praised and their projection into the future presented in a glowing light. Every effort will be made to enhance revolutionary fervor and the sense of historic destiny. The vision of a communist society looming on the horizon of time will be described as the creation of a future new "Communist man." There may be some doubt whether the Chinese image of this man will follow the current Soviet line expressed in the term "socialist humanism."¹ Whereas Khrushchev and the Soviet party leaders appear to be seeking for the present to maintain a fairly even balance between the collectivism and the individualism which have been inherited in large measure from the earlier Russian and Western European traditions, the effort of Mao and his vast apparatus of cadres seems to be heavily weighted on the side of collectivism.

40. In part this is a reaction against, in part an adaptation of classic values expressed in the Confucian ethic and the traditional Chinese family. The Anniversary will discuss the progress which has been made in extirpating the "irrational and feudal" tyranny of the old style Chinese family and will cite the emancipation of women from the drudgery of the house-

¹ SRS is preparing a study on this concept.

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hold as a great source of personal fulfillment and productive energy. A particular appeal will be made to younger women who, like their Soviet sisters, will be challenged with the prospects of creative careers in fields such as engineering, medicine, and education.

41. Unquestionably a principal theme of the Anniversary will be the progress of Chinese education. Statistics on the establishment of schools and institutes of higher learning at all levels from Peking down to the individual communes will be coupled with promises of further expansion. At the same time the "red and expert" line will be reaffirmed, and, as in the Soviet Union, the vital tie between education and productive labor will be declared to be the essence of Marxist society. In this tie will be placed the unfolding of the moral, spiritual, and cultural values of "socialism" which are contrasted with those of the "reactionary bourgeois" tradition.

42. More specifically, the progress of the illiteracy drive will be documented with impressive statistics. There may be some announcement of further progress in the simplification of the Chinese characters. At the same time the Romanization campaign (Pin-Yin system) will also be propagandized. Its virtues will be stressed in terms of universal communication rather than of the less palatable fact that the regime will be able to rewrite Chinese literature for mass consumption, editing them suitably in the process.

43. In the broad cultural field the Anniversary may proclaim an impending Communist cultural renaissance.¹

¹ In addition to innumerable special anniversary exhibitions, albums, films, books and spectacles which are standard for such occasions, there may be some announcement of a "People's Encyclopedia, " to match the Great Soviet Encyclo-

Having in effect entrapped the intellectuals by the "Hundred Flowers" campaign and then crushed those who were deceived thereby, Mao may feel that he can now adopt something more like the relatively tolerant position of Khrushchev. Thus the Anniversary might declare that vigilance is still necessary, that revisionism and "rightist" tendencies still exist, but that the overwhelming majority of the creative intellectuals now fully understand their position and therefore may again be permitted to "bloom and contend." It would seem to us that this would be a fairly safe offer and that few intellectuals would be so foolhardy as to take it for an invitation to renew the unbridled criticism of 1957 and invite a subsequent "anti-rightist rectification."

44. Among the intellectuals the scientists will probably be singled out for special encouragement. The construction of research institutes and the scientific achievements of the past ten years will be cited as earnest of a great upsurge in the field which, within a relatively short period of time, should bring China to a level comparable to some of the more advanced western nations. Progress in nuclear research, cybernetics, and other sophisticated disciplines will be stressed. In the scientific and cultural fields there will certainly be numerous professions and demonstrations of Sino-Soviet solidarity, friendship and cooperation. It is possible that some dramatic technological event, such as the launching of a man into space or a moon probe, might be undertaken from Chinese soil with the participation of Chinese personnel. On a less spectacular scale, there may be the first showing of a wide-screen color film "The Wind from the East" which

pedia. Since such a work would take several years to complete, it might be published in the Pin-Yin system, to be ready for the generation which is being educated in it.

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was prepared in China by a Sino-Soviet team during July and August. Soviet propaganda has already espoused the Chinese initiated theme "The East Wind Prevails over the West", and the entire Anniversary may stress it,¹ along with other anti-Western themes such as "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers."

45. Youth will probably be the object of particular glorification. There will be organized parades and gymnastic exercises and collective professions of loyalty to Comrade Mao and the regime. The next World Youth Festival may be announced for Peking in 1961. Some effort may be made to counteract the generally unfavorable impression left by the recent Vienna Festival, though probably this will be left to the passage of time.

CONCLUSION

46. Our forecast of the 10th Anniversary celebration has been predicated on the assumption that Communist China now enjoys co-leadership with the Soviet Union in the "world socialist system." In any case where two men ride the same horse there may be some question who effectively holds the reins, but we do not believe that in the present situation the question is acute. Mao and the Chinese Communist leaders have repeatedly deferred to the ideological primacy, to the rich "revolutionary experience" and to the superior might of their senior partners. Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders have just as explicitly insisted on the reality of China's co-equality and its unlimited potential.

¹ For some time we have been of the opinion that the use of the terms "East" and "West" to contrast the Communist and the Free World is disadvantageous to our cause, especially in Asia.

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47. Inevitably in any relationship between great powers - whether bound in a conventional military alliance or in a "monolithic socialist" camp - there will be frictions, disagreements and clashes of interest. The Sino-Soviet tie is no more free of these than is NATO. And yet, in our opinion, it would be a grave imprudence on the part of the Free World and the United States to impute major discord to the partners of the Moscow-Peking Axis, and to derive from such a judgment, any complacency over the threat which the International Communist movement presents. Rather, we should view any current evidences of "tension" as part of the general campaign of "socialist emulation."

48. Although emphasis will be given to political and economic problems on the Chinese mainland, this will be put within the framework of international Communist policies. We therefore believe that the 10th Anniversary will be a most impressive demonstration of Communist solidarity and dynamic purpose. It should display the broad outlines of the "socialist construction" program, within which, according to Khrushchev's recent doctrinal "innovation," all members of the "system" will reach the goal at approximately the same time. Beyond that it will prefigure the "transition to Communism," still remote by as much as a full human generation, but looming ever more distinctly as the inexorable processes of history and of "life" unfold.

49. Thus, the 10th Anniversary will be viewed by the Bloc as another great milestone of the Communist Revolution. When Mao and Khrushchev stand side by side, they will sincerely regard themselves as "comrades in arms." Each is aware that his appointed "struggle" is nearly over and that others will bear the flag. But both will display supreme confidence that it will not falter.

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